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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether return migrants are more likely to become
entrepreneurs than non-migrants. We develop a theoretical search model that puts forward
the trade o faced by returnees since overseas migration provides an opportunity for human
and physical capital accumulation but, at the same time, may lead to a loss of social capital
back home. We test the predictions of the model using data from Egypt. We nd that,
even after controlling for the endogeneity of the temporary migration decision, an overseas
returnee is more likely to become an entrepreneur than a non-migrant. Although migrants
may lose their social capital, they accumulate savings and experience overseas that increase
their chances of becoming entrepreneurs.
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1 Introduction
What makes an entrepreneur? This question has been the focus of few previous studies,
which have tended to analyze the determinants of self-employment in developed countries
and transitional economies (see, for example, Blanchower and Oswald, 1998; Evans and
Jovanovic, 1989; Evans and Leighton, 1989; Djankov et al., 2005). Yet, very few papers
have attempted to study this question for developing countries. Meanwhile, the wealth and
poverty of developing countries are linked to the entrepreneurial nature of their economies.
Entrepreneurship plays an important role in economic growth, innovation, and competitive-
ness as rst highlighted by Schumpeter in 1911, but may also play a role in poverty alleviation
(Landes, 1998). It is thus crucial to understand what makes an entrepreneur in developing
countries.
The rather small literature on this issue has put forward the importance of nancial
constraints in becoming an entrepreneur. Access to credit is seen as a major obstacle for en-
trepreneurship (see, e.g., Banerjee and Newman, 1983). Limited personal and family savings
and lack of access to credit are seen to severely limit the growth prospects of promising star-
tups in developing countries. Thus, policymakers and international organizations, interested
in economic development, have supported micro-credit programs in developing countries as
a means to encourage entrepreneurship. More recently, international migration has played
an important role in allowing this liquidity constraint to be overcome. Temporary migration
has been a conduit through which individuals have the opportunity to accumulate savings
that can be used upon their return for setting up businesses.
Several studies have been interested in how international migration provides a channel for
accessing credit through overseas savings by focusing on the impact of savings on the occupa-
tional choice of returnees and in particular on self-employment and entrepreneurship. Using
cross-sectional data from Pakistan, Ilahi (1999) nds that, upon return, savings become a
signicant factor in the choice of self-employment over waged employment. Mesnard (2004)
models migration as a way to overcome credit constraints in the presence of capital markets
imperfections. She nds that the majority of entrepreneurial projects started by Tunisian
returnees were totally nanced through overseas savings.1 Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002)
develop a model where migrants simultaneously decide on the optimal migration duration and
1In another paper, Mesnard and Ravaillon (2006) examine not only the eect of credit constraints (wealth)
but also wealth inequality among return migrants in Tunisia.
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their after return activities. They nd that among Turkish returnees more than half of them
are economically active and engage in entrepreneurial activities. McCormick and Wahba
(2001) add a dierent insight by showing that savings matter more than human capital ac-
quisition for the probability of entrepreneurship of illiterate Egyptian returnees. However, for
the educated returnees, both access to credit, through overseas savings, and human capital
accumulation are signicant determinants of entrepreneurship upon return. Woodru and
Zenteno (2007) nd that migration networks help overcome capital constraints in Mexico.
Using a survey of self-employed workers and small rm owners in Mexico that have access
to remittance ows, they estimate the impact of attachment to migration networks on the
level of capital investment, the capital-output ratio, sales, and prots of microenterprises.2
However most of those studies limit their analysis to return migrants only, whilst Woodru
and Zenteno (2007) consider households of migrants receiving remittances rather than return
migrants. Yet, one important question is whether return migrants are more likely than non-
migrants to become entrepreneurs (set-up businesses). The issue of whether return migrants
are more or less likely to become entrepreneur has not been addressed before.
Although physical capital is an important determinant of entrepreneurship and has been
seen as an important factor by economists, there are potentially other factors that may
impact on the individual's decision of setting up a business. Sociologists have stressed
the importance of social capital as a determinant of entrepreneurship: entrepreneurs rely
on their contacts for information and services (see, e.g. Greve and Sala, 2003). This
is an issue that has not really been tackled by economists. An exception is the work by
Djankov et al. (2005, 2006) who provide suggestive evidence on the role played by social
networks on entrepreneurship. They nd that individuals whose relatives and school friends
are entrepreneurs are themselves more likely to be entrepreneurs. Indeed, several economic
studies have examined the role of social networks in migration (see e.g. Munshi, 2003;
McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010) and others have studied the role of social networks in job
acquisition (see e.g. Wahba and Zenou, 2005). This migration literature has focused on the
role played by social networks in the migration decision through reducing migration cost, for
example, and in nding jobs upon arrival in the host country. However, the role played by the
origin social networks in entrepreneurship has not attracted previous attention. Moreover,
no one has examined the possible loss of social capital at country of origin as a result of
2See also Oswald and Blanchower (1998) who study who becomes an entrepreneur in the UK.
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emigration and whether this impacts on the entrepreneurial decision upon return.
The aim of this paper is to study what makes an entrepreneur and to address the follow-
ing questions. Are return migrants more likely to become entrepreneurs than non-migrants?
Does emigration result in loss of social capital, hence out of sight, out of mind, and thus
negatively aect the entrepreneurship decision? As a result, this paper attempts to ad-
dress this important policy question regarding the determinants of entrepreneurship and
whether return migrants are more likely to become entrepreneurs compared to non-migrants.
This should impact on policies directed towards encouraging entrepreneurship and providing
micro-credit in many developing countries.
To answer the above questions, one needs to control for the potential endogeneity of
the migration decision and the entrepreneurial decision upon return. On the one hand,
migration might increase the probability of entrepreneurship but, on the other, it could be
that individuals planning to be an entrepreneur are more likely to migrate. First, we develop
a theoretical search model where we endogenize the migration and the entrepreneurship
decisions and show the trade o faced by returnees since overseas migration provides an
opportunity for human and physical capital accumulation but, at the same time, may lead
to a loss of social capital back home. Then, we test these predictions using the Egyptian
Labour Market Survey in 1998 by looking at both overseas returnees and non-migrants. We
control for the potential endogeneity between temporary migration and entrepreneurship.
We nd that, controlling for the temporary migration decision, a returnee is more likely
to become an entrepreneur than a non-migrant. Although migrants may potentially lose
their social capital, they accumulate savings and experience overseas that increase their
entrepreneurship.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model. In Section 3,
we describe the data, whilst the econometric model is presented in Section 4. The empirical
ndings are examined in Section 5 and further robustness checks are discussed. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.
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2 Theory
2.1 The model
Consider a continuum of individuals whose mass is n in a given country (Egypt in the data).
Ex ante, individuals are heterogenous in two dimensions: their (innate) entrepreneurship
talent, which we denote by t, and their migration costs c. Talent t is drawn from a cumulative
distribution F (t), which is continuous on the support interval

t; t

. The migration cost c
is drawn from a cumulative distribution G(c), which is continuous on the support interval
[c; c]. We assume that there are no correlations between F (t) and G(c) so that, for example,
a very talented person may have a very high migration cost because he/she has a large family
and/or because he/she is older.3
The timing is as follows. In the rst stage, each individual in the home country (Egypt in
the data) decides whether to migrate to another country or not without knowing their talent
t. In our model, as it is the case in our data for Egypt (see below), we are only focussing on
temporary migration, which means that when an individual decides to migrate, he/she knows
with certainty that he/she will return to the home country.4 Then, those who have migrated
return to their home country. We refer to them as returnees while those who have never
migrated are referred to as non-migrants. An individual i is identied with the subscript
i = re in the former case and i = nm in the latter. The mass of returnees and non-migrants
are denoted by nre and nnm, with nre + nnm = n. In the second stage, talent t is revealed
to each individual i and each of them has to decide whether to become an entrepreneur or
a waged worker.
2.2 The labor market
We use a standard search-matching model (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Pissarides, 2000)
to describe the labor market.
Matching function The allocation of jobs is modelled as in the simplest case analyzed
in Pissarides (2000, Chapter 1), with an important modication necessitated by the intro-
3We could assume that these two distributions are correlated in some way. This would make the analysis
easier but also less interesting.
4Over 90 percent of Egyptian migration is temporary in nature.
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duction of entrepreneurs. Suppose that, at some time t, entrepreneurs have created and are
managing a total of m+ v jobs, with m of them occupied by workers and v of them vacant.
There are m+ u workers in this market, one in each occupied job and u unemployed. Each
of the m occupied jobs produces a constant ow of output y and continues producing this
output until a negative shock arrives. When the negative shock arrives, an event that takes
place at rate , the job is closed down, the worker becomes unemployed and the entrepreneur
opens another job to replace it. Workers share the surplus from the job according to the
Nash solution to an implicit wage bargaining. There is no on-the-job-search since all jobs are
identical and therefore (see below) the wage will be the same for all workers.5 In aggregate,
these processes imply that there is a number of contacts per unit of time between the two
sides of the market that are determined by the following matching function:
M =M(u; v) (1)
As in the standard search-matching model (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Pissarides,
2000), we assume that M is increasing both in its arguments, concave and homogeneous
of degree 1 (or equivalently has constant return to scale). Given the matching function
(1), we can determine the rate at which vacancies are lled. It is equal to: M(u; v)=v 
q() where   v=u is the labor market tightness. By using the properties of M , it is
easily veried that q0()  0: the higher the labor market tightness, the lower the rate
at which rms ll their vacancy. Similarly, the rate at which an unemployed worker leaves
unemployment isM(u; v)=u  q(). Again, by using the properties ofM , it is easily veried
that [q()]0  0: the higher the labor market tightness, the higher the rate at which workers
leave unemployment since there are relatively more jobs than unemployed workers.
Expected utilities and wages Agents discount the future at rate r, are risk neutral,
have rational expectations and live innitely. In steady-state, the discounted expected utility
of employed and unemployed workers are respectively given by:6
rIL = wL    (IL   IU) (2)
5Even if all jobs are identical, there can be on-the-job-search behavior if rms post wages (Burdett and
Mortensen, 1998). This is not the case here since wages are bargained between workers and rms.
6IL and IU are the steady-state expected utilities of employed and unemployed workers who have decided
not to become entrepreneurs. These are the waged workers.
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rIU = wU + q() (IL   IU) (3)
with
IL   IU =
wL   wU
r +  + q()
(4)
By plugging (4) into (2) and (3), we nally get:
rIL =
wU + [r + q()]wL
r +  + q()
(5)
rIU =
(r + )wU + q()wL
r +  + q()
(6)
Let us denote by IF and IV the intertemporal prot of an entrepreneur with a lled job
and a vacancy, respectively. If  is the search cost for the rm per unit of time and y is the
product of a match, then, at the steady-state, IF and IV can be written as:
rIF = y   wL   (IF   IV ) (7)
rIV =  + q()(IF   IV ) (8)
which implies that:
IF   IV =
y   wL + 
r +  + q()
(9)
By plugging (9) into (7) and (8), we obtain:7
rIF =
[r + q()] (y   wL)  
r +  + q()
rIV =
q() (y   wL)  (r + )
r +  + q()
(10)
Let us now determine the wage. At each period, the total intertemporal surplus is shared
through a generalized Nash-bargaining process between the rm (i.e. the entrepreneur) and
7Contrary to the standard matching model (Pissarides, 2000), we do not have a free-entry condition
IV = 0 that determines the number of jobs created. Here it is determined by i. See equation (15) in
Section 2.5.
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the (waged) worker. The total surplus is the sum of the surplus of the workers, IL  IU , and
the surplus of the rms IF   IV . At each period, the wage is determined by:
wL = argmax
wL
(IL   IU)
(IF   IV )
1  (11)
where 0    1 represents the bargaining power of workers. By solving (11), we obtain the
following sharing rule:
(1  ) (IL   IU) =  (IF   IV )
Using (3) and (8), this can be written as:8
rIU = wU +

1  
 (+ rIV )
By replacing rIU by its value in (6), we obtain the following wage:
wL = wU +

r + 
q()
+ 

 (+ rIV )
1  
(12)
Plugging the wage wL (12) into (10), we obtain:
rIV =
(1  ) q() (y   wU)  [r +  +  q()]
(1  ) q() + r +  +  q()
(13)
We can also calculate rIU in a similar way and we obtain:
rIU =
[(1  ) q() + r + ]wU + q() (y + )
[(1  ) q() + r +  +  q()]
(14)
Lemma 1 By totally dierentiating (13) and (14), we obtain
@IV
@
< 0
@IV
@y
> 0
@IV
@wU
< 0
@IV
@
< 0
@IV
@
< 0
@IU
@
> 0
@IU
@y
> 0
@IU
@wU
> 0
@IU
@
> 0
@IU
@
< 0
8Indeed, (3) and (8) can be written as:
IL   IU =
rIU   wU
q()
IF   IV =
rIV + 
q()
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2.3 Second stage: The decision to become an entrepreneur
In the second stage, each worker i = re; nm knows his/her type t and has to decide whether
or not to become an entrepreneur. Let us explain the way the entrepreneurship decision is
made. Each individual i = re; nm can either be an entrepreneur or a waged worker but not
both. If individual i decides to become an entrepreneur, then he/she can create and manage
i jobs. This means that, even if each job corresponds to one worker, an entrepreneur
has i jobs. In our model, i also represents the capacity of individual i to becoming an
entrepreneur. We assume that:
i = tHi + Si (15)
where Hi captures both the human and physical capital of individual i while Si is the size
and quality of his/her social network. Let us explain and motivate in more detail equation
(15). An individual i who decides to become an entrepreneur has the capacity of creating
a number of jobs i, depending upon his/her talent t, his/her human/physical capitals Hi
as well as the size and quality of his/her social network Si. Formula (15) implies that, for
the determination of employment ability i, talent t and human/physical capital Hi are
complement but human and physical capitals Hi and social capital Si are independent of
each other. This is a particular way of modelling entrepreneurial's job creation. In Section
2.6, we extend our model to the case where Hi and Si are not anymore independent but are
complement and consider a more general formulation than (15).
In equation (15), we are making dierent assumptions that we would like to discuss now.
First, the innate entrepreneurship talent t is not indexed by i since people are born with it and
does not depend on any migration decision. We assume that returnees and non-migrants
are born with a talent t from exactly the same cumulative distribution of abilities F (t).
Second, because returnees have accumulated human capital and savings (physical capital)
through their experience abroad, it is assumed that Hre > Hnm. Third, Si is capturing
the social network that individuals have, an important feature of the Egyptian labor market
(Wahba and Zenou, 2005). Si captures both the number and the quality (i.e. human capital,
connections, etc.) of the social network.9 We assume that Snm > Sre, which captures the idea
9We do not model explicitly the social network as, for example, in Calvo-Armengol (2004), Calvo-
Armengol and Zenou (2005) and Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) because we do not have this information
in our dataset.
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that people who migrate lose part of their social network. This is a reasonable assumption
since a person who has left a country for say four or ve years is less likely to keep all his/her
social contacts compared to someone who has not migrated.10
In this model, once an individual i has decided to become an entrepreneur or a waged
worker, then there is no dierence between returnees and non-migrants in terms of produc-
tivity, wages, etc. Having migrated or not only changes the i, the capacity of becoming
entrepreneur but then, once a decision has been made, all individuals are assumed to be
identical.11
There is a start-up cost of a new company, which is denoted byK. If individual i becomes
an entrepreneur, ex ante he/she will get iIV  K while the expected utility from being a
worker is IU .
12
Among the returnees (i.e. those who have migrated in the rst stage and have returned
to their home country), an individual i = re will become an entrepreneur if and only if:
reIV  K  IU (16)
Using (15), we can therefore dene a reservation value of entrepreneurial talent etre for
type re individuals as
etre = IU +K
IVHre
 
Sre
Hre
(17)
such that all returnees with t  etre will become entrepreneurs while the other returnees will
become waged workers. As a result, F (etre)nre is the number of waged workers among the
returnees and

1  F (etre)nre is the number of entrepreneurs among the returnees.
Similarly, among the non-migrants, an individual i = nm will become an entrepreneur if
10In a previous version of this paper, we dierentiated between strong and weak ties, assuming that
migrants lose their weak ties but not their strong ties when leaving the country. Since we do not have good
information on weak and strong ties in our dataset, we have here focused only on the size and quality of the
network, assuming that the size reduces when someone leaves a country (which could be interpreted as the
fact that the migrant mainly loses his/her weak ties).
11Fonseca et al. (2001) model the capacity of individual i of becoming an entrepreneur in a similar way
but do not have social networks and do not model the migration decision.
12Indeed, this person is still unemployed when he/she makes the entrepreneur decision. If he/she decides
to become a worker, he/she will go to the labor market as an unemployed worker and look for a job.
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and only if:
nmIV  K  IU (18)
Using (15), we can therefore dene a reservation value of entrepreneurial talent etre for
type re individuals as
etnm = IU +K
IVHnm
 
Snm
Hnm
(19)
such that all non-migrants with t  etnm will become entrepreneurs while the other non-
migrants will become waged workers. As a result, F (etnm)nnm is the number of waged workers
among the non-migrants and

1  F (etnm)nnm is the number of entrepreneurs among the
non-migrants. It can easily be veried that:
etre R etnm , SnmHre   SreHnm
Hre  Hnm
R
IU +K
IV
(20)
This inequality highlights the trade o faced by returnees and migrants when deciding to
become entrepreneurs. On the one hand, returnees have accumulated more human and
physical capital abroad so that Hre > Hnm but have lost part of their social networks, i.e.
Snm > Sre. As a result, it is not clear if etre > etnm, in which case non-migrants are more likely
to be entrepreneurs than returnees, or etre < etnm, in which case returnees are more likely to
be entrepreneurs than non-migrants.
Equation (17) or (19) is the job creation equation that gives a relationship between eti and
. In the Appendix, we show that
@
h
IU+K
IV
i
@
> 0
which implies that (17) or (19) denes a positive relationship between eti and , for i = re; nm
Indeed, when the labor-market tightness  increases, it is easier for returnees to nd jobs
(since q() increases) and thus they prefer to work rather than to be entrepreneur. As a
result, etre increases, which reduces the fraction of entrepreneurs among the returnees in the
economy since  aects the same way each type i of individuals.
Denote by yIU and 
y
IV
the productivity elasticity of the utility of the unemployed and
rms with a vacant job, i.e.
yIU 
@IU
@y
y
IU
> 0 and yIV 
@IV
@y
y
IV
> 0
11
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Denote also by IU and 

IV
the job destruction elasticity of the utility of the unemployed
and rms with a vacant job, i.e.
IU   
@IU
@

IU
> 0 and IV   
@IV
@

IV
> 0
We have the following results:
Proposition 1 Returnees are more likely to be entrepreneur than non-migrants,
(i) the higher is Hre=Hnm, the ratio of the human and physical capitals of returnees and
non-migrants;
(ii) the lower is Snm (the size of the social network of non-migrants) and/or the higher is
Sre (the size of the social network of returnees);
(iii) the higher is the start-up cost K, the labor-market tightness , the unemployment benet
wU , and/or the cost of creating a single job ;
(iv) the lower is the workers' productivity y and/or the job destruction rate if yIU < 
y
IV
and IU < 

IV
.
This proposition states that, given that the migration choice has already been made and
given that all individuals know their entrepreneurial talent t, then the higher is Hre=Hnm, the
more likely returnees will be entrepreneurs than non-migrants. Remember that, depending
if their t is greater or lower than etre, returnees can be either entrepreneurs or waged workers.
The same applies to non-migrants with respect to etnm. So, when Hre=Hnm is large, meaning
that the human and physical capital accumulated abroad by returnees is very important
compared to that of the non-migrants, then, for a given dierence in social networks between
returnees and non-migrants, the former are more likely to be entrepreneurs than the latter
since etre < etnm. The same reasoning applies to the other parameters in (ii), (iii) and (iv).
2.4 First stage: The migration decision
Let us now solve the rst stage, i.e. the migration decision. As stated above, each individual
does not know his/her t when the migration decision is made. He/she only knows his/her
migration cost c. Observe that a migrant is automatically a returnee since we only focus
12
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on temporary migration, as it is the case in Egypt. As a result, the expected utility of a
returnee is given by:
EUre =  c+
Z etre
t
IU f(t)dt+
Z t
etre
(reIV  K) f(t)dt
=  c+ F
 etre IU + IV Z tetre re f(t)dt  1  F  etreK
Using (15), this can be written as:
EUre =  c+ F
 etre IU + IV Hre Z tetre t f(t)dt+ 1  F  etre (IV Sre  K)
or equivalently
EUre =  c+ F
 etre IU + 1  F  etre IV Sre  K + IV HreE  t j t  etre (21)
since
E
 
t j t  etre = R tetre t f(t)dt
1  F
 etre
is the expected value of entrepreneurial talent among the returnee entrepreneurs. Indeed, ex
ante, each individual does not know his/her t and each returnee, who has migrated, has to
pay a migration cost c, which is a sunk cost. If it turns out that his/her t is below etre, which
occurs with probability P
 
t  etre = F  etre, then this returnee will become a waged worker
and have a utility equals to IU . To be consistent with the previous section, we assume that
a returnee (but also a non-migrant) has to be rst unemployed before nding a job. This
is because, in developing countries like Egypt, most jobs are found through word-of-mouth
communication and social networks (Wahba and Zenou, 2005). So one has rst to gather
information about jobs and then nd a job.13 On the other hand, if his/her t is aboveetre, which occurs with probability P  t > etre = 1   F  etre, then this returnee will become
entrepreneur and thus have a utility equals to IV Sre  K + IV HreE
 
t j t  etre.
Using a similar argument, the expected utility of a non-migrant is equal to:
EUnm = F
 etnm IU + 1  F  etnm IV Snm  K + IV HnmE  t j t  etnm (22)
13It is easily veried that none of our results would be aected if we had assumed that a returnee could
nd a job directly so that his/her expected utility as a waged worker would be IL instead of IU .
13
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Consequently, the value of ec that makes an individual indierent between migrating and not
migrating (i.e. EUre = EUnm) is given by:
ec = F  etre  F  etnm (IU +K) + 1  F  etre IV Sre +HreE  t j t  etre
 

1  F
 etnm IV Snm +HnmE  t j t  etnm (23)
This is very intuitive since it says that for an individual, who does not know his/her entre-
preneurial talent t, to be indierent between migrating (i.e. returnee) and non-migrating,
it has to be that the expected cost of migrating is exactly equal to the expected benet of
migrating. As a result, all workers with a c < ec will migrate and then become returnees
while those with a c  ec will be non-migrants.14 The total number of returnees nre is thus
equal to:
nre = nG(ec) (24)
while the total number of non-migrants is: nnm = n  nre = n [1 G(ec)].
For example, consider a uniform distribution of t for which t = 0 and t = 1. Then
F
 etre = etre and F  etnm = etnm. In that case, for i = re; nm,
E
 
t j t  eti = R 1eti t dt
1  eti = 1 + eti2
and
ec =  etre   etnm (IU +K) +  1  etre IV
"
Sre +Hre
1 + etre
2
#
 
 
1  etnm IV
"
Snm +Hnm
1 + etnm
2
#
We have the following proposition:
14To avoid uninteresting cases, we assume that c < ec < c, which could be guaranteed by conditions on
parameters. We could totally characterize all the possible equilibria such as, for example, when ec  c (all
individuals are non-migrants) or ec > c (all individuals are returnees) but this does not correspond to what
we observe in the data. As a result, we only focus on interior equilibria.
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Proposition 2
(i) Consider all individuals with a migration cost c lower than ec, where ec is dened by
(23). These are individuals who will migrate and become returnees. Then, among the
returnees, those for which t < etre (where etre is dened by (17)) will become waged
workers while those for which t  etre will become entrepreneurs.
(ii) Consider now all individuals with a migration cost c higher (or equal) than ec. These
are individuals who will not migrate. Then, among the non-migrants, those for which
t < etnm (where etnm is dened by (19)) will become waged workers while those for which
t  etnm will become entrepreneurs.
This proposition just states that there will be four dierent groups in equilibrium: waged-
workers returnees (individuals with both c < ec and t < etre), entrepreneur returnees (individ-
uals with both c < ec and t  etre), waged-workers non-migrants (individuals with both c  ec
and t < etnm), and entrepreneur non-migrants (individuals with both c  ec and t  etnm).
2.5 Closing the model
Let us close the model. First, let us determine the number of jobs created in this economy.
Each entrepreneur i = re; nm of type t  eti creates i = tHi + Si jobs (both vacant and
lled jobs), i.e. entrepreneurs create jobs up to the maximum they can manage. Hence, the
total number of (lled and unlled) jobs created by returnee entrepreneurs re is equal to:
re = nre
Z t
etre
re f(t)dt = nre
Z t
etre
[tHre + Sre] f(t)dt (25)
Similarly, the total number of (lled and unlled jobs) jobs created by non-migrant entre-
preneurs nm is:
nm = (n  nre)
Z t
etnm
[tHnm + Snm] f(t)dt (26)
since n = nre+nnm. As a result, the total number of (lled and unlled) jobs created in the
economy is given by:
m+ v = re +nm
= nre
Z t
etre
[tHre + Sre] f(t)dt+ (n  nre)
Z t
etnm
[tHnm + Snm] f(t)dt (27)
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Let us now determined the number of (employed and unemployed) workers in the economy.
We assumed that there are n individuals (i.e. workers and entrepreneurs). Let us denote by
nW and by nE the total number of workers (employed and unemployed) and entrepreneurs
(with a lled and a vacant job) in this economy so that n = nW + nE. Observe that
nE = nre

1  F (etre)+ (n  nre) 1  F (etnm)
so that
nW = nreF (etre) + (n  nre)F (etnm) (28)
where ni F (eti) are the number of (employed ad unemployed) workers of type i = re;m in
the economy. If we further denote by u the total number of unemployed workers, we have:
nW = m+ u (29)
since m is the number of jobs occupied, thus employed workers. Combining (27) and (29),
we obtain: m = nW   u = re +nm   v, which is equivalent to:
nW   u = nre
Z etre
t
f(t)dt+ (n  nre)
Z etnm
t
f(t)dt  u
= nre
Z t
etre
[tHre + Sre] f(t)dt+ (n  nre)
Z t
etnm
[tHnm + Snm] f(t)dt  v
where v the total number of vacancies. Observe that, even if returnee and non-migrant
entrepreneurs do not create the same number of jobs, the jobs are exactly the same (in
terms of wage, productivity) so that workers of any type are indierent between working in
any type of job. This is why the matching function is written as in (1) and the labor market
tightness is equal to   v=u.
We now need an equation that determines the ows in the labor market. The evolution
of employment in terms of the rm's transition rates is:

m = v q() m
which, using (27), is equivalent to:

m =
"
nre
Z t
etre
[tHre + Sre] f(t)dt+ (n  nre)
Z t
etnm
[tHnm + Snm] f(t)dt m
#
q() m
(30)
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The evolution of employment in terms of the worker's transition rates is:

m = u q()  (nW   u) 
which, using (29), is equivalent to:

m = (nW  m) q() m (31)
In steady-state,

m = 0, and (30) and (31) are respectively given by:
nre
Z t
etre
[tHre + Sre] f(t)dt+ (n  nre)
Z t
etnm
[tHnm + Snm] f(t)dt =

 + q()
q()

m
m =
nW q()
 + q()
By combining these two equations and using (28) and (24), we obtain:
nG(ec) Z tetre [tHre + Sre] f(t)dt+ n [1 G(ec)]
Z t
etnm
[tHnm + Snm] f(t)dt
=
[ + q()] 
 + q()

nG(ec) F (etre)  F (etnm)+ nF (etnm)	 (32)
The equilibrium is now easy to calculate. There are four equations: (17), (19), (23) and
(32) and four unknowns: etre, etnm, ec and .
2.6 Extension: Human/physical capital and social capital are com-
plement
Let us now extend the model to capture the fact that human/physical capital and social
capital are complement and introduce a more general function. For that, we adopt the
following formulation for equation (15):
i = tH

i S

i (33)
where  > 0,  > 0. In this new formulation, Hi and Si are not anymore independent in the
job creation of entrepreneur since
@2i
@Hi@Si
=
@2i
@Si@Hi
= t H 1i S
 1
i > 0
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This means that human/physical capital and social capital are (strategic) complement, i.e.
the higher is the social capital of individual i, the higher is the marginal (positive) eect
of his/her human capital on the number of jobs he/she can create as an entrepreneur. The
decision to become entrepreneur is still given by: iIV  K  IU , which is equivalent to:
eti = IU +K
IVH

i S

i
(34)
instead of (17) or (19). If we look at the second stage, i.e., the decision of becoming an
entrepreneur, it is easily veried that Proposition 1 can now be written as:
Proposition 3 Returnees are more likely to be entrepreneur than non-migrants,
(i) the higher is Hre=Hnm, the ratio of the human and physical capitals between returnees
and non-migrants;
(ii) the higher is Sre=Snm, the ratio of the size of the social network between of returnees
and non-migrants.
In other words, parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1 are the same. We lose parts (iii)
and (iv) of Proposition 1 because, when comparing etre and etnm, i.e., etre R etnm, the term
IU+K
IV
cancels out (see (34)) and thus labor-market variables as well as the start-up cost do
not aect this inequality. In fact, it is easily veried that this inequality is equivalent to:
(S) R (H), where H = Hre
Hnm
and S = Sre
Snm
.
If we now look at the rst stage, i.e., the migration decision, then it is easily veried that
the expected utility of migration is now given by:
EUre =  c+ F
 etre IU + 1  F  etre IV Hre Sre E  t j t  etre K
while the expected utility of a non-migrant is equal to:
EUnm = F
 etnm IU + 1  F  etnm IV Hnm Snm E  t j t  etnm K
Consequently, the value of ec that makes an individual indierent between migrating and not
migrating is now given by:
ec = F  etre  F  etnm (IU +K) + 1  F  etre IV Hre Sre E  t j t  etre
 

1  F
 etnm Hnm Snm E  t j t  etnm (35)
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This is very close to expression in (23), the only dierence being that Hi and Si cannot be
expressed separately. Proposition 2 will be exactly the same with, however, dierent values
of etre and etnm (which are now given by (34) for i = re, nm instead of (17) and (19)) and ec
(which is now given by (35) instead of (23)). Finally, the model can be closed as before and
an equilibrium with four equations and four unknowns can be found.
The model above provides the theoretical underpinning for our empirical estimations.
In particular, we test whether a returnee is more or less likely to become an entrepreneur
compared to a non-migrant. We also try to disentangle three possible channels, namely social
networks, overseas human capital and overseas savings, through which temporary migration
might impact entrepreneurship.
The general idea of the model is that overseas temporary migration provides an oppor-
tunity for human and physical capital accumulation but, at the same time, may lead to loss
of social capital back home. We have shown in our theoretical analysis that there may be a
trade o between those two factors.
3 The data
To test this idea, we will use data from a rich survey: Egypt Labor Market Survey 1998
(ELMS1998) carried out by the Central Agency of Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAP-
MAS) in Egypt. The 1998 ELMS is a nationally-representative household survey that gath-
ered data on a wide range of labor market variables at the household and individual level
covering 5,000 households. Each data set consists of three questionnaires: 1) the household
questionnaire; 2) the individual questionnaire; 3) the family enterprise questionnaire. Each
household has at least one household questionnaire and one individual questionnaire. If any
of the members of the household was self-employed or an employer, a family enterprise ques-
tionnaire for this household was administrated. Data for the household questionnaire was
collected from the head of the household and included the roster of members of the household,
each individual's relationship to the head of the household and demographic characteristics
of the household. The individual questionnaire collected information from individuals (aged
15 years old or more) themselves. A battery of individual modules was designed to collect
data on individual characteristics, employment characteristics, unemployment, mobility and
career history, and earnings. We make use of the family enterprise questionnaire, which being
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part of a household survey, gathered information on all economic units and establishments
regardless of rm size as is common in establishment surveys and thus captured all employ-
ment in the economy not just that occurs within xed establishments of a certain size. The
family enterprise module is extremely valuable in providing detailed picture of entrepreneur-
ship. Although the 1998 ELMS is a cross-sectional individual level data, it benets from
collecting very rich retrospective data on labor market mobility and residential mobility.
In fact, individuals report previous and pre-previous labor market characteristics including
employment status, sector, occupation, economic activity, job stability, and location among
others, which enable us to have detailed information for stayers and returnees.
One limitation of this dataset is that we observe only returnees i.e. migrants who are
currently overseas are not observed in our survey. However, it is fairly uncommon to observe
current migrants when using survey collected at the home country in particular if a whole
household is currently overseas. Since we do observe both returnees and non-migrants, we are
able to control for the potential selectivity of return migration (see below). Yet, there may
still potentially be a selectivity bias if return migrants are dierent from current migrants.
However, this bias should be small in our case study for the following reasons. Firstly, the
majority of Egyptian migration is temporary in nature.15 The bulk of Egyptian emigration
is destined towards other Arab countries and the Gulf States. As noted by Lucas (2008),
migration to the Gulf States is all temporary in nature with the mean migration duration
of around four to ve years and acquisition of citizenship being eectively impossible for
anyone. Secondly, Egyptian temporary migration ows are comprised of both highly skilled
and unskilled, predominately males. Thirdly, the Central Agency of Public Mobilization and
Statistics in Egypt (CAPMAS) distinguishes between temporary and permanent migration
based on destination. CAPMAS estimates were, in 2000, around 2 million temporary mi-
grants and around 800 thousand permanent migrants mainly in North America, Australia
and Western Europe. However, estimates by the OECD (2005) and Docquier and Marfouk
(2004) of the Egyptian migrant stock in 2000 in OECD countries were much less, at 254
thousand and 275 thousand, respectively. Finally, in 2006, around 2.5 percent of the pop-
ulation in (15 - 65 years old) have worked overseas previously i.e. are overseas returnees.16
Thus, although we do not observe current migrants, the majority of them are temporary
15See CAPMAS (2003), World Bank (2009, p.16) and Nassar (2008).
16See Wahba (2009).
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migrants and therefore are likely to return. Thus the selectivity bias we are likely to have is
the result of not observing permanent migrants who might be dierent in characteristics, yet
they are a small number relative to returnees given the temporary nature of migration. As
a result, in this paper, our focus is on temporary migration: we correct for the temporary
migration choice as discussed below.17
The analysis in this paper is restricted to males over 25 years of age at the time of the
survey. We dene an entrepreneur as an employer or a self-employed owner of economic
unit. We adopt this denition to enable us to study entrepreneurship and business set up.
For both groups of entrepreneurs, trade and agriculture seem to be the two most common
economic activities of the enterprises. The majority of enterprises are sole ownership and,
as seen in Table A1, are very small in size with mean of less than 3 workers.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on returnees and non-migrants for the total sample.
Table 1 shows that 31% of returnees are entrepreneurs compared to 25% among non-migrants.
Overall, returnees seem to be of similar age, but more educated relative to non-migrants.
[Insert Table 1 here]
4 Econometric Framework
In this section, we estimate the determinants of entrepreneurship to examine whether re-
turnees are more or less likely than stayers to become entrepreneurs and if there is a trade
o between the loss of social capital and the gain in human and physical capitals as a result
of temporary migration. We capture the interdependence between temporary/return migra-
tion and entrepreneurship, by using a seemingly unrelated regression bivariate probit model
where the two decisions are not independent, although this is something we test for later.
In addition, one potentially confounding factor is that temporary/return migration and en-
trepreneurship may be endogenously determined. Individuals migrate temporarily because
they plan to become entrepreneurs on their return, whilst, on the other hand, temporary
migration might inuence the occupational choice of returnees and therefore their prospects
of becoming entrepreneurs.18 We use a recursive bivariate probit model to take care of the
17Only 3 percent of our returnees in 1998 migrated to Non-Arab countries (i.e. America and Europe).
18One can imagine a more complicated model where also social networks, overseas human capital and
overseas savings are all endogeneous. Estimating such a model would require a superior data to instrument
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endogeneity between entrepreneurship and return migration decisions, where return migra-
tion appears as a regressor in the entrepreneurship equation.19 This is estimated using full
information maximum likelihood estimation (FIML). Formally, we have
Ei =  
0Xi + !RMi + 1Hi + 2Si + 3Ki + "i (36)
with
Ei = 1 if E

i > 0
= 0 otherwise
RMi = 
0Zi + i (37)
with
RMi = 1 if RM

i > 0
= 0 otherwise
where E ["i] = E [i] = 0, V ar ["i] = V ar [i] = 1, and Cov ["i; i] =  and where Ei
equals one when an individual is an entrepreneur (business owner) while RMi equals one if
an individual is a returnee. The dependent variables Ei and RM

i are unobserved latent
variables. We observe only a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not an individual
is an entrepreneur Ei and whether or not an individual is a returnee RMi. An individual
decides to become an entrepreneur (Ei > 0) if he/she has a minimum level of needed talent
for this job. The return migration decision depends on the cost of migration: an individual
migrates (RMi > 0) if his/her migration cost is below a certain level.
Equation (36) shows that Ei, the probability of being an entrepreneur for individual i, is
a function of Xi, a vector of explanatory variables and whether the individual is a returnee
(RM = 1) or not (RM = 0 otherwise). Equation (37) estimates the return migration
for all those channels at the same time. A few papers have examined the endogeneity of one aspect of
migration (such as savings or migration duration) and the occupational choice of returnees. See, for example,
Mesnard (2004) and Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002).
19See Greene (1998) and Greene (2008) for a further description of recursive bivariate probit models.
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decision, which is a function of Zi, a vector of explanatory variables.
20 These two decisions
are treated as two interdependent decisions and  is the coecient of correlation between
the two error terms. A signicant  would support this assumption of interdependence. In
the theoretical model, we also treated these two decisions (becoming an entrepreneur and
migration) as interdependent.
Equation (36) corresponds to (17) or (19) in the theoretical model. Indeed, the probability
of becoming entrepreneur in the theoretical model is 1  F (eti) = 1  F  IU+KIVHi   SiHi, which
is a function of Hi, Si and K as well as IU and IV dened by (6) and (10). Unfortunately, we
do not have information on IU and IV or what aects them, that is, labor-market variables
like wages, the job-destruction rate, rms' entry costs, etc. Observe that the probability of
becoming entrepreneur is a function of RMi, i.e. if the individual is a returnee (RM = 1)
or not (RM = 0 otherwise), and is captured by the fact that i = re; nm in the theoretical
model.
Equation (37) corresponds to (23) in the theoretical model. Indeed, the probability of
migrating is G(ec), which is a function of the individuals' characteristics. Importantly, in the
theoretical model, when someone decides whether to migrate or not, he/she does not know
his/her entrepreneurial talent t, which means that he/she does not know whether he/she will
be an entrepreneur or a waged worker in the future. Since Hi and Ki(human and physical
capital of individual i) and Si (size and quality of his/her social network) aect entrepreneurs
but not waged workers, this implies that, what mainly matters for the migration decision,
is the migration cost c (this is known with certainty), which is a function of individual
characteristics.
Finally, as observed above, the decision to become entrepreneur and to migrate are not
independent decisions and are correlated. In the econometric model, this is captured by
 = Cov ["i; i]. In the theoretical model, it is captured in Proposition 2. Indeed, depending
on whether an individual has migrated (and became a returnee) or not, the decision to
become an entrepreneur is dierent. To be more precise, if this individual has decided to
migrate, then he/she will become an entrepreneur if and only if his/her talent t is greater thanetre while, if the same individual has decided not to migrate, he/she will be an entrepreneur
only if his/her t is larger than etnm, etre and etnm being dierent (see (17) and (19)).
Although it is sucient to have variation in the exogenous variables in both equations
20We detail them below.
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to avoid identication problems,21 this would heavily rely on the assumption of bivariate
normality. Thus, to improve identication of the return migration equation,22 we impose an
exclusion restriction. We use the average real international oil prices23 when the individual
is 28 years since the average age at migration in our sample is 28 years and the majority
of the Egyptian migrants migrate to the Gulf States where demand for imported labor is
highly correlated with oil prices (see e.g. Lucas, 2008).24 Examining the destination of the
returnees in our sample, we nd that over 95% of our sample migrated to Arab countries
where oil prices played an important role in the demand for foreign labor directly in the
Gulf States, or indirectly as a replacement workers in non-oil Arab countries such as Jordan
and Lebanon. Historic real oil prices should aect migration but should not be directly be
correlated with entrepreneurship at the time of the survey.
Going back to our outcome of interest, namely entrepreneurship, we examine rst the
determinants of equation (36). To capture the main eect of social capital/network,25 we
use, as our main measure of Si, whether the migrant has had other members of his family
migrate with him. If other members of the household have migrated as well, this is likely to
lead to a loss of origin social capital for the migrant. Indeed, if the migrant migrates with
household members, he will then have fewer strong ties with local knowledge that would
help him on his return to set-up a business. We also include another measure of social
network Si namely whether the individual originally lived in small neighborhood (with less
than 5,000 inhabitants)26 to capture tight-knit communities where people tend to know
each other. Since individuals might rely on their social networks to obtain information that
might help them in setting-up a business, one would expect that, as a result of migration,
a migrant is likely to lose contacts with his former contacts, especially if they are not close
friends (for example, weak ties). Thus a migrant may not be able to draw on his contacts
21See Greene (2008, Sec 23.8.4). Wilde (2000) also shows that exclusion restrictions are not needed
provided there is one varying exogenous regressor in each equation.
22Monfardini and Radice (2008) show that the use of instruments help obtain results that are more robust
to distributional misspecication.
23Historic average real international oil prices are from www.inationdata.com.
24We have tried several ages : 25, 26 and 27. Our results are robust to the choice of the mean age in our
sample.
25Although migrants might develop new social networks in the destination country, we have no information
on destination social networks to enable us to capture this eect.
26The average population of a neighborhood (qism) is around 11,000 with the median being 6,000 inhabi-
tants. Hence we chose 5,000 since it is slightly smaller than the median size.
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as a stayer when it comes to information on setting-up business or knowing all the practical
issues related to establishing an enterprise. In addition, we control for whether the returnee
has been back from overseas in the last year since we believe that, if individuals lose their
social capital, they would be unlikely to start a business in their rst year upon return. We
check below the robustness of our results by extending the period of return to the previous
2 years.
Djankov et al. (2005, 2006) use as a measure of social networks whether individuals
have had entrepreneurs in their family or friends from their childhood and adolescence.
We also control for whether an individual's father was self-employed or employer when the
individual was 15 years, which we believe can have an eect on the occupational choice of
the individual and thus might aect his probability of becoming an entrepreneur. We also
control for the current characteristics of the neighborhood of residence using the share of
self-employed workers, the share of employers, and the share of unemployed workers, among
total employed adult males by \qism" in 1996 using Census data to capture local labor
market eects that might aect the probability of entrepreneurship, in addition to including
regional xed eects to capture regional inuence.
To capture the potential gain in human capital from overseas work, which corresponds
to Hi in the theoretical and econometric model, we use a dummy variable to measure oc-
cupational mobility. This dummy variable is equal to 1 if the individual had an unskilled
occupation before migration and a skilled occupation overseas, or if the individual was out
of the labor force before migrating (i.e. were not working) and then worked whilst abroad.
In other words, we proxy gains in overseas human capital as skill enhancement measured by
upward occupational mobility whilst overseas relative to the pre-migration status.
We control for whether the entrepreneur who migrated have used personal savings to
start up his business (savings correspond to K in the theoretical model). Unfortunately, we
do not have data on personal savings for entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, only whether
entrepreneurs have used their savings to set up their businesses.
Finally, the vector Xi includes individual characteristics. The individual characteristics
are age, marital status and education. Six educational dummies are used: no education (ref-
erence group), read and write, less than intermediate, intermediate, higher than intermediate
and university education. Experience in the Egyptian labor marker measured in years and
its square to capture non-linearity are also used. Experience is calculated as the dierence
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between the year of the survey and year the individual entered the labor market for the rst
time, where for returnees also any time spent overseas is deducted.
To explain the determinants of return migration, in addition to the instrument mentioned
above, the vector Zi includes individual characteristics such as age and educational levels.
To control for the migration decision, previous job characteristics, occupation and residence
are used. For migrants, those refer to the job characteristics (public sector), occupation
and urban/rural region of residence prior to migration and for non-migrants these refer to
previous job/ residence if they have changed jobs/ residence before or current ones if they
have not. For a detailed description of the variables, see Table A1.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on entrepreneurs relative to non-entrepreneurs, dis-
tinguishing between returnees and non-migrants. First, in terms of our main social network
measure, Table 2 shows that around 10 percent of returnee non-entrepreneurs had other
family members who migrated compared to 7 percent among returnee entrepreneurs, i.e.
returnee entrepreneurs are less likely to have had other members of their family overseas.
Also, the proportion of non-migrants entrepreneurs with other social contacts (measured by
a variable equals to 1 if the individual has lived previously in a neighborhood with less than
5,000 inhabitants and zero otherwise) are higher than among returnees. The social network
measures provide preliminary support for the importance of social capital in entrepreneur-
ship and show that returnee entrepreneurs having lower social capital relative to non-migrant
entrepreneurs. In addition, on average, returnee entrepreneurs were overseas for 5.4 years
compare to 4.8 years among returnee non-entrepreneurs. The dierence between migrant
human capital amongst entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs look larger although it is not
statistically signicant. Around 87 percent of returnee entrepreneurs have used their savings
to start-up their businesses. In terms of individual characteristics, 14 percent of returnee
entrepreneurs were self-employed before migration compared to only 3 percent of returnee
non-entrepreneurs. Also more than half of the entrepreneurs among both returnees and
non-migrants had a father who was self-employed or employer which supports Djankov et al.
(2005, 2006) ndings. Thus, the descriptive statistics indicate a potential trade o between
social capital on one hand and human and physical capital on the other hand as important
determinants of entrepreneurship.
[Insert Table 2 here]
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5 Empirical ndings
This section presents the results of the estimation of our empirical models, starting with the
simple binary probit estimation, followed by recursive bivariate probit results. First, as a
baseline comparison, we estimate a simple univariate probit of the probability of being an
entrepreneur (i.e. business owner) at the time of the survey and include a dummy for being
returnee but we do not control for the migration decision. The marginal eects are reported
in Table 3. We nd that returnees are 10 percent more likely than non-migrants to become
entrepreneurs.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Second, we estimate a recursive bivariate probit model where the rst equation estimates
the probability of being an entrepreneur and the second equation estimates the probability
of being a returnee, where being a returnee is an endogenous regressor in the rst equation.
Table 4 displays the results. First, it is worth noting that the correlation coecient between
the probability of becoming an entrepreneur and being a returnee is signicant, indicating
that the error terms are interdependent. However, the correlation coecient is negative
suggesting that unobservable characteristics aect those two decisions in opposite ways.
For example, being a risk taker will not increase both probabilities: it might increase the
probability of entrepreneurship but not of return migration, or that entrepreneurs are less
likely to become migrants because they prefer non-waged work and migration to the Gulf
States is mostly waged work. It is also important to note that the exclusion restriction,
average real oil price, is signicant suggesting that it is a signicant determinant of migration.
Table 4, Col 1, shows the estimates for the baseline recursive bivariate probit model. Col
2, introduces two of the channels through which migration aects entrepreneurship namely
overseas human capital and origin social networks, whilst in Col 3 we also control for whether
the father was employer and nally Col 4 introduces the last channel namely overseas savings.
Table 4 shows that, controlling for the endogeneity of the migration decision, a returnee is
less likely to become an entrepreneur if members of his family have also emigrated than if he
emigrated on his own or is the sole emigrant from his household. This suggests that, when
more household members migrate, fewer social ties at home could be used by the returnee to
help him set up a business. Also, those who come from \small origin neighborhood" are more
likely to become an entrepreneur reecting the support system from a tight knit community.
However, this eect is not signicant for returnees, suggesting again that migration leads
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to some loss of the social network. It is important noting that we also control for the
characteristics of the local neighborhood. Having returned in the last year from overseas
has a negative eect on the probability of being an entrepreneur. This might suggest that
returnees need time to rebuild their social networks upon return. On the other hand, the
eect of overseas human capital is positive and signicant, suggesting that acquired overseas
skills increase the probability of entrepreneurship. Finally, we nd (Col. 4) that savings or
credit matter for becoming an entrepreneur for returnees.
[Insert Table 4 here]
To check the robustness of our results, we conduct several sensitivity checks as shown
in Table 5. First, since we only have data on the date of start of business for the last 8
years at the time of the survey, in column 5, we use this information to control for the date
of start of business to better capture labor market conditions. We nd that our previous
results are robust. In column 6, we exclude the entrepreneurs who were self-employed before
migration and nd that our previous results hold and are not driven by including individuals
who were entrepreneurs before migration. In column 7, we vary the length since return by
using 2 years instead of one. We nd that returning in the last two years has negative,
albeit not signicant, eect on the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. Furthermore,
in column 8, to ensure that our results are not biased by overseas remittances, we exclude
from our sample those households/individuals who were receiving remittances. The results
are still robust. Finally, we estimate a full bivariate probit model (not SURE) where we
include the same controls in both equations plus the instrument in the migration equation
to allow for pre-migration characteristics to aect not only the migration decision but also
the entrepreneurship decision. We also allow migration to depend on the location of origin by
including the small origin neighborhood and the characteristics of the neighborhood. Again,
all our previous results hold.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Overall, our results suggest that temporary migration might lead to a loss of social
networks. We also nd that human capital and savings matter for becoming an entrepreneur
for returnees. The joint probability of being a returnee and entrepreneur is around 19%,
and only 14% for being a non-migrant and an entrepreneur. Interestingly, conditional on
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being a returnee, the probability of becoming an entrepreneur is almost 50%. This suggests
that one needs to control for the endogeneity of the migration decision when studying the
entrepreneurship decision.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines an important issue for developing countries, namely what factors aect
entrepreneurship. We focus on the case of return migrants and develop a theoretical search
model that puts forward the trade o faced by returnees since overseas migration provides an
opportunity for human and physical capital accumulation but, at the same time, may lead
to a loss of social capital back home. We test the predictions of the model using Egyptian
data and nd that, controlling for the endogeneity of the temporary migration decision, an
overseas returnee is more likely to become an entrepreneur than a non-migrant. Our results
suggest that social networks increase the probability of entrepreneurship for non-migrants
but not for returnees. On the other hand, human capital and savings aect the likelihood of
returnees of becoming entrepreneurs. Interestingly, the ndings also indicate that, although
return migration and entrepreneurship are correlated, there might be a trade o between
these two decisions.
This paper sheds light on a very important policy issue for developing countries by show-
ing how entrepreneurship depends on social networks, human capital and credit. Although
migrants may potentially lose their social capital, they accumulate savings and experience
overseas that increase their entrepreneurship. This, in a way, emphasizes the importance of
access to credit as a major obstacle facing by entrepreneurs in developing countries. As a
result, policies focusing on access to credit is of paramount importance for investment and
thus for economic growth and development. Meanwhile, our ndings also support schemes
adopted to help return migrants re-integrate back upon their return due to the potential loss
of social capital whilst overseas.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. First, observe that to determine which individual has the
highest probability to become entrepreneur, we have to check the following condition:
etre R etnm (38)
which is equivalent to:
SnmHre   SreHnm
Hre  Hnm
R
IU +K
IV
(39)
We know that SnmHre   SreHnm > 0 and Hre  Hnm > 0 so this inequality can go in both
directions.
(i) The inequality (39) can be written as:
SnmH   Sre
H   1
R
IU +K
IV
where H = Hre
Hnm
. We have
@

SnmH Sre
H 1

@H
= Snm (H   1)  (SnmH   Sre)
= Sre   Snm < 0
As a result, for a given IU+K
IV
, Snm and Sre, the left-hand side of (39) is decreasing in H.
Thus the higher is H, the higher is the dierence in human capital between returnees and
non-migrants, the more likely a returnee is an entrepreneur, i.e. etre < etnm.
(ii) We can do a similar exercise for Smn and Sre. We have:
@
h
SnmHre SreHnm
Hre Hnm
i
@Snm
> 0 and
@
h
SnmHre SreHnm
Hre Hnm
i
@Sre
< 0
which means the lower Snm and/or the higher Sre, the more likely a returnee is an entrepre-
neur, i.e. etre < etnm.
(iii) Let us now focus on the right hand side of (39). Denote by x any parameter. We
have
@
h
IU+K
IV
i
@x
=
@IU
@x
IV   [IU +K]
@IV
@x
(IV )
2
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Now, using Lemma 1, we obtain:
@
h
IU+K
IV
i
@
> 0
@
h
IU+K
IV
i
@wU
> 0
@
h
IU+K
IV
i
@
> 0
(iv) For y and , the sign is not determined. However, we have:
@
h
IU+K
IV
i
@y
R 0()
@IU
@y
y
IU
R

1 +
K
IU

@IV
@y
y
IV
()
yIU
yIV
R 1 +
K
IU
where
yIU 
@IU
@y
y
IU
> 0 and yIV 
@IV
@y
y
IV
> 0
If yIU < 
y
IV
, then
@
h
IU+K
IV
i
@y
< 0.
@
h
IU+K
IV
i
@
R 0()   [IU +K]
@IV
@
R  
@IU
@
IV
()
IU
IV
Q 1 +
K
IU
where
IU   
@IU
@

IU
> 0 and IV   
@IV
@

IV
> 0
If IU < 

IV
, then
@
h
IU+K
IV
i
@
< 0.
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Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Returnees Non-Migrants 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Individual Characteristics at time of survey     
Entrepreneur (%) 31.28 46.42 24.80 43.19 
Age (years) 41.81 8.19 41.57 11.62 
Married (%) 89.16 31.62 78.86 40.84 
Educational level (%)
None 14.04 34.78 22.67 41.87 
Read & write 9.11 28.82 12.71 33.31 
Less than intermediate 14.78 35.53 18.51 38.84 
Intermediate 31.77 46.62 21.44 41.05 
Higher than intermediate 6.90 25.37 6.98 25.48 
University  22.41 42.39 17.70 37.17 
Previous Work/Residence Characteristics (%) 
Urban resident: Previous 65.71 47.59 67.83 46.72 
Waged worker : Previous 62.56 48.46 34.06 47.40 
Public sector worker: Previous 19.70 39.83 31.18 46.33 
Previous Occupation dummies (%) 
Technical & scientific: Previous 18.23 38.65 15.11 35.82 
Management : Previous 0.01 8.57 1.64 12.68 
Clerical: Previous 5.91 23.61 8.18 27.40 
Sales: Previous 5.67 23.15 9.42 29.21 
Services: Previous 4.93 21.67 6.38 24.44 
Agriculture: Previous 10.34 30.49 18.95 39.20 
Production: Previous 25.12 43.43 29.11 45.43 
Regions of Residence (%)
Greater Cairo 20.20 40.20 20.45 40.34 
Alex & Canal Cities 12.81 33.46 12.76 33.36 
Lower Urban 17.24 37.82 16.14 36.80 
Upper Urban 15.02 35.78 17.99 38.41 
Lower Rural 22.17 41.59 19.25 39.43 
Upper Rural 12.56 33.18 13.40 34.07 
     
Real Oil price at age 28 43.54 20.28 39.80 21.99 
Sample Size 406 4342 
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Table 2: Data Statistics of Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs
 Entrepreneurs Non-Entrepreneurs 
Variable Returnee Non-Migrants Returnee Non-Migrants 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Individual Characteristics
Age (%) 42.84 7.90 44.74 10.45 41.34 8.29 40.53 11.79 
Married (%) 96.85 17.53 90.81 28.91 85.66 35.11 74.92 43.36 
LM experience in Egypt (years) 19.83 10.92 29.26 13.12 18.11 10.57 22.37 14.17 
Self-employed bef. migration (%) 14.17 35.02   2.87 16.72   
Father: employer (%) 43.79 49.59 33.12 47.11 18.31 38.75 16.87 37.45 
Educational level: (%)
None 17.32 37.99 30.86 46.21 12.54 33.18 19.96 39.97 
Read & write 10.24 30.43 17.01 37.59 8.60 28.09 11.29 31.65 
< than intermediate 14.96 35.81 18.96 39.22 14.70 35.47 18.36 38.72 
Intermediate 30.71 46.31 14.22 34.94 32.26 46.83 23.83 42.61 
>  than intermediate 7.09 25.76 4.93 21.65 6.81 25.24 7.66 26.59 
University  19.69 39.92 14.03 34.75 25.09 43.43 18.91 39.17 
Social Network
Family migrated (%)    7.87   27.04   10.03 30.10   
Small origin neighborhood 3.51 18.48 9.84 29.81 1.83 35.30 8.77 28.26 
Returned in last year 3.15 17.53 0.00 0.00 4.66 21.11 0.00 0.00 
Returned in last 2 years 5.51 22.91 0.00 0.00 9.68 29.62 0.00 0.00 
Migration Related Characteristics
Overseas Human Capital 51.75 50.19   55.31 49.80   
Migration duration (years) 5.36 5.02   4.81 4.56   
Savings
      
Migrant used savings (%) 87.40 33.31     
District Characteristics
Share of Self employed  18.71 11.16 19.37 10.72 17.92 10.45 18.45 10.20 
Share of employer 7.77 6.44 7.72 8.88 8.70 8.46 6.97 7.44 
Share of unemployed 6.81 2.72 7.22 2.98 7.09 2.62 7.31 2.99 
Regions (%) 
        
Greater Cairo 15.75 36.57 14.95 35.67 22.22 41.65 22.27 41.61 
Sample Size 127 1077 279 3265 
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Table 3: Probability of being Entrepreneur 
Marginal Effects 
Returnee 0.102 
 (4.22)*** 
Individual Characteristics 
LM experience in Egypt 0.010 
 (4.96)*** 
LM exp. in Egypt Sq. -0.0001 
 (2.29)*** 
Age -0.002 
 (1.64)** 
Educational level ( ref. group: none)
Read & write -0.006 
 (0.26) 
Less than intermediate -0.014 
 (0.70) 
Intermediate -0.051 
 (2.33)*** 
Higher than intermediate  -0.023 
 (0.75) 
University  0.005 
 (0.20) 
Pred Prob (at X bar) 0.238  
Sample Size 4327                                    
Pseudo R2    0.0604 
Log Pseudo likelihood - 304.21 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. Regional dummies included. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4: Bivariate Probit Estimates: Probability of being an Entrepreneur and 
Probability of being a Returnee 
 1 2 3 4 
Probability of being Entrepreneur     
Returnee 1.377 1.251 1.012 0.368 
 (9.58)*** (9.27)*** (7.02)*** (1.70)* 
Social Network     
Family migrated   -0.654 -0.687 -0.467 
  (3.15)*** (3.18)*** (1.38) 
Small origin neighborhood  0.168 0.172 0.161 
  (2.11)** (2.16)** (2.00)** 
Small origin neighb * returnee  -0.044 -0.123 0.639 
  (0.09) (0.23) (1.27) 
Returned in last year  -0.126 -0.167 -5.646 
  (0.54) (0.68) (16.20)*** 
Human Capital     
Overseas Human Capital  0.075 0.076 0.107 
  (1.89)* (1.99)*** (2.75)*** 
Physical Capital     
Migrant used savings    0.028 
    (35.15)*** 
District Characteristics     
Share of Self employed   0.250 0.209 0.281 
  (1.14) (0.95) (1.16) 
Share of employer  0.765 0.765 0.964 
  (1.63) (1.69)* (2.44)** 
Share of unemployed  0.016 0.016 0.018 
  (1.65)* (1.62) (2.01)** 
Individual Characteristics     
Father: employer   0.515 0.316 
   (5.64)*** (1.45) 
Self-empl. before migration  0.909 0.888 1.265 
  (4.03)*** (3.75)*** (11.71)*** 
LM experience in Egypt 0.031 0.033 0.033 0.043 
 (6.74)*** (7.16)*** (7.16)*** (7.88)*** 
LM exp in Egypt Sq. -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (2.19)** (1.95)* (1.85)* (1.82)* 
Age -0.009 -0.011 -0.011 -0.017 
 (1.29) (1.48) (1.33) (2.01)** 
Educational level ( ref. group: none)    
Read & write -0.022 0.032 0.026 0.025 
 (0.38) (0.45) (0.35) (0.34) 
Less than intermediate -0.094 -0.042 -0.047 -0.014 
 (1.58) (0.53) (0.60) (0.20) 
Intermediate -0.318 -0.269 -0.277 -0.260 
 (5.24)*** (3.14)*** (3.09)*** (3.47)*** 
Higher than intermediate  -0.219 -0.190 -0.194 -0.191 
 (2.54)** (1.83)* (1.86)* (1.80)* 
University  -0.151 -0.091 -0.098 -0.011 
 (2.07)** (0.98) (0.98) (0.12) 
Constant -1.103 -1.410 -1.382 -1.394 
 (7.77)*** (5.82)*** (5.62)*** (5.42)*** 
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 1 2 3 4 
Probability of being Returnee 
    
Real Oil prices at age 28 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (5.66)*** (5.30)*** (5.36)*** (5.55)*** 
Individual Characteristics     
Age 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 (2.61)*** (2.37)** (2.30)** (2.27)** 
Educational level ( ref. group: none)
Read & write 0.151 0.130 0.122 0.114 
 (1.60) (1.39) (1.29) (1.21) 
Less than intermediate 0.263 0.214 0.208 0.221 
 (2.22)** (1.83)* (1.78)* (2.00)** 
Intermediate 0.705 0.689 0.681 0.664 
 (11.07)*** (12.45)*** (12.44)*** (12.01)*** 
Higher than intermediate  0.515 0.484 0.476 0.439 
 (3.37)*** (3.27)*** (3.22)*** (3.02)*** 
University  0.508 0.448 0.440 0.438 
 (5.23)*** (5.12)*** (4.92)*** (3.45)*** 
Previous Employment Characteristics
Public sector worker: Previous -0.907 -0.913 -0.910 -0.903 
 (8.22)*** (7.61)*** (7.52)*** (7.57)*** 
Urban resident: previous -0.147 -0.138 -0.135 -0.136 
 (1.49) (1.38) (1.39) (1.41) 
Previous Occupation dummies ( ref: technical, & scientific)
Management: Previous -0.663 -0.629 -0.638 -0.697 
 (2.96)*** (2.68)*** (2.70)*** (2.92)*** 
Clerical: Previous -0.506 -0.521 -0.531 -0.561
 (5.11)*** (5.24)*** (5.29)*** (6.28)*** 
Sales: Previous -0.552 -0.599 -0.615 -0.625 
 (4.50)*** (4.80)*** (4.90)*** (4.70)*** 
Services: Previous -0.445 -0.456 -0.456 -0.486 
 (4.81)*** (4.48)*** (4.33)*** (4.46)*** 
Agriculture: Previous -0.668 -0.730 -0.741 -0.766 
 (6.12)*** (6.95)*** (7.13)*** (7.63)*** 
Production: Previous -0.512 -0.529 -0.530 -0.548 
 (7.67)*** (7.37)*** (7.08)*** (6.92)*** 
Constant -1.677 -0.730 -1.611 (6.92)*** 
 (8.70)*** (6.95)*** (7.32)*** (6.87)***
Rho -0.605 -0.555 -0.540 -0. 625 
Wald test of rho=0:         chi2(1) =   46.87 42.75 51.77 80.44 
Sample size  3980 3980 3752 3752 
Log Pseudo likelihood -3400.90 -3194.52 -3185.97 -3021.47 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; ** *significant at 
1%. 
Regional dummies included. 
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Table 5: Further Sensitivity Analysis: Bivariate Probit Estimates:  
Probability of being an Entrepreneur  
 5 6 7 8 9  
Returnee 1.068 1.004 1.011 1.014 0.640  
 (7.93)*** (7.06)*** (7.01)*** (6.46)*** (2.00)**  
Social networks 
    
Family migrated -0.816 -0.739 -0.695 -0.670 -0.630         
 (2.87)*** (3.04)*** (3.28)*** (3.14)*** (2.94)**  
Small origin  0.154 0.174 0.172 2.968 0.169    
neighborhood (1.92)* (2.19)** (2.17)** (2.91)*** (1.98)**     
Small origin neighb *  -0.062 0.009 -0.123 0.173 0.151     
returnee (0.12) (0.02) (0.22) (0.58) (0.26)    
Returned in last year -1.263 -0.068  -0.156 -0.115     
(4.61)*** (0.32)  (0.64) (0.45)     
Returned in last 2    -0.070    
years   (0.43)    
Human Capital 
    
Overseas Human Capital 0.087 0.081 0.076 0.075 0.129     
(2.40)** (2.07)** (1.98)**    (1.95)* (2.91)**    
      
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses.  *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 
1%. 
Those are the estimates from the first equation in the bivariate probit model. Only selected variables 
are shown.  Model 5 includes dummies for date of start of business. Model 6 excludes those who were 
self-employed before migration. Model 7 uses 2 years since return dummy. Model 8 excludes 
households receiving remittances. Model 9 is not SURE: includes the same controls in both equations  
plus the instrument in the migration equation.
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Table A1: Characteristics of Enterprises  
Variable
Owned by 
Returnee  
Owned by  
Non-Migrant  
Location of Enterprise (%) 
Urban  53.15 48.60 
Rural 29.73 32.40 
Mobile (not fixed) 17.12 18.99 
Economic Activity (%)
Agriculture 19.30 27.00 
Manufacturing 12.28 11.01 
Construction 4.39 5.05 
Trade 41.23 34.49 
Transport & Commerce 11.40 6.99 
Services 7.02 10.75 
Others 4.38 4.71 
   
Ownership (%)   
Sole Ownership 85.96 87.68 
   
Number of employees   
Less than 5 90.27 91.04 
5 - 9 8.23 5.84 
10 or more 1.50 3.42 
Mean number of employees 2.60 2.93 
   
Legal characteristics   
Licence or registration 68.15 48.51 
Regular Bookkeeping  16.81 13.95 
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Table A2: Data Appendix 
Variable Definition 
Individual Characteristics 
Age Age in years at the time of survey 
Married Martial Status at the time of survey 
LM experience in Egypt Years of experience in the Egyptian labor market. 
LM experience in Egypt Sq Years of experience in the Egyptian labor market squared 
Father: employer =1 if the individual’s father was employer when the individual was aged 15 
years of age. 
Educational level
None =1 if the individual has no education  
Read & write =1 if the individual can read and write  
Less than intermediate =1 if the individual has less than intermediate education (6 years). 
Intermediate =1 if the individual has intermediate education (9 years) 
Higher than intermediate =1 if the individual has higher than intermediate educ. (12 years) 
University  =1 if the individual has university education (16 yrs of education). 
Social Networks 
Family migrated Returnee whose household members migrated as well 
Small origin neighborhood  =1 if individual lived previously (origin) in a neighborhood with < than  
     5,000 inhabitants 
Small origin neighb * returnee =1 if returnee lived prior to emigration in a neighborhood with < than 5,000  
 inhabitants 
Returned in last year =1 if the individual returned from overseas in the last year  
Returned in last 2 years =1 if the individual returned from overseas in the last 2 years  
Migration Related Characteristics 
Migrant used savings Value of savings used by migrant to start-up business  
Overseas Human Capital =1 for returnees who moved up the occupational ladder (from unskilled job 
prior to migration to skilled occupation overseas) or who were out of labour 
force before emigrating but worked overseas. 
District Characteristics 
Share of Self employed in 96 Share of self employed among total employed adult males in district (qism) 
in 1996, based on Census 
Share of Employer in 96 Share of employer among total employed adult males in district (qism) in 
1996, based on Census 
Share of Unemployed in 96 Share of unemployed among total employed adult males in district (qism) in 
1996, based on Census 
Previous Work/Residence Characteristics
Urban resident: Previous Previous residence: urban dummy 
Public sector worker: Previous Previous sector of employment: public sector dummy 
Self-empl. before migration  Self-employed before migration & returnee dummy 
Previous Occupation dummies 
Technical & scientific: Previous Previous occupation: Technical & Scientific dummy 
Management: Previous Previous occupation: Management dummy 
Clerical: Previous Previous occupation: clerical dummy
Sales: Previous Previous occupation: sales dummy
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Services: Previous Previous occupation: services dummy
Agriculture: Previous Previous occupation: agriculture dummy
Production: Previous Previous occupation: production dummy
Regions of Residence (%)
Greater Cairo =1 if individual lives in Greater Cairo at time of survey
Alex & Canal Cities =1 if individual lives in Alexandria & Canal Cities at time of survey
Lower Urban =1 if individual lives in Lower Urban at time of survey
Upper Urban =1 if individual lives in Upper Urban at time of survey
Lower Rural =1 if individual lives in Lower Rural at time of survey
Upper Rural =1 if individual lives in Upper Rural at time of survey
Instrument 
Real oil price at age 28 Historic real international oil prices when the individual was 28 years  
 of age 
Dependent variables 
Entrepreneur =1 if the individual is an employer or self employed owner of economic 
 enterprise 
Returnee =1 if the individual is a return international migrant 
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